

# DE KLERK'S OPEN AGENDA

De Klerk has no secret agenda. He does not hide his commitment to a future South Africa in which the people will be tied hand and foot to prevent them from doing away with the *real essence* of race domination.

It is true that he has so far gone further than any other white leader. The steps already taken and some others which are promised are by no means cosmetic. It is a measure of the crisis brought about by mounting internal and external pressures that he has gone as far as he has.

But he has over and over again spelt out his limits. In short, we are being told that whatever else happens there will never be majority rule. Instead we are offered a so-called 'universal and equal franchise' of a special kind. It would lead to the election of a parliament which would, in practice, be powerless to deal with the accumulated white race privileges. All this in the name of so-called 'group rights' to prevent, so it is claimed, the replacement of white domination with black domination.

#### Let us stop playing games.

The regime knows only too well that our liberation movement, which represents an unequalled diversity of culture, language, religion and tradition, would be the last to oppose the unqualified protection of such rights. Indeed, we have over and over again committed ourselves to their protection both in policy and in practice.

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**NO GROUP RIGHTS OR PRIVILEGES!** 

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But these are not the kind of rights or the kind of veto the regime is really talking about. It is using the protection of these basic human rights as a cover-up for something else. It is a cover-up for the continuation of the essentials of apartheid by other means. And we need to be clear what we mean by apartheid.

## WHAT WE MEAN BY APARTHEID

Apartheid, in its broader meaning, is not just the denial of political rights, segregation, population registration, segregated beaches and so on. It is true that apartheid not only went further in all these areas but also combined it with intensified state repression. But at the end of the day apartheid was the **continuation** of race domination by other means. Its rationale remained the same as the system of domination which preceded it; to underpin **economic domination and privilege** in a new situation of rising resistance and defiance.

If tomorrow every racist statute were to be repealed it would, of course, be a considerable advance. But if, at the same time, the constitution made it impossible to redistribute wealth or to interfere with the virtual white monopoly of our country's economic riches, liberation would be less than half complete. Apartheid, as we understand it, would remain in place. And it is this key element of apartheid which De Klerk wants to carry over into the future under the guise of protecting 'group rights.

## **OUR RESPONSE**

What should be our response? Should we be tempted to follow the great Kwame Nkrumah when he said to Africa 'seek ye first the political kingdom'? There is some wisdom in these words. They suggest a power reality which may make it difficult to achieve everything in one fell swoop and imply a degree of compromise.

We of course cannot rule out the possibility of acceptable compromises at any future negotiating table. But, to concede a constitution which would be a permanent block against the redistribution of wealth would not be such a compromise; it would be an act of surrender.

If De Klerk's insistence on his version of group rights and minority vetoes is not just a bargaining chip, there will be little hope for a positive outcome of the negotiating process.

We are, of course, committed to go to a negotiating table if the obstacles spelt out in the Harare Declaration are removed. We do not go

#### ONE PEOPLE ONE PARLIAMENT!

along with those armchair revolutionaries with their mythical armies who scream 'treason' at the very mention of the word dialogue. There is very little in their practice which can teach us about actual struggle. It is precisely because we have fought and not just talked that the other side is forced even to contemplate a political solution.

## THE PEOPLE AND THE TABLE

The period since the release of some of our most cherished leaders has seen our millions responding to rising militancy in both town and countryside. But let us also concede a weakness. The slogans around which people are gathering and acting are focused on immediate local issues and the removal of obstacles to negotiation. These struggles remain vital. But we must go beyond them.

The time has never been more ripe to channel the people's energies and power towards demands which go to the very roots of our immediate liberation objectives. We must more and more raise the demands of:

- \* Equal votes for all
- \* A fully democratic constituent assembly
- \* Redistribution of land
- \* Redistribution of wealth and income
- \* One united, democratic, non-racial South Africa.

Recent history has shown that a people in motion around their democratic aspirations and using their organised economic strength are unstoppable.

For us the negotiating table is one of the terrains of struggle and not a substitute for struggle. We know that the outcome is not written in the stars. Nor will it depend on smooth talk. It will depend on the power of our people on the ground acting together in unity, discipline and organisation.



### **END ALL SEGREGATION!**

## SABOTAGING THE FUTURE

The bosses and the regime are moving fast to secure their own interests while they still have the power to do so. Their aim, openly stated, is to make sure a future democratic government does not have as much economic power as the present regime.

Among the manoeuvres are:

- Privatisation
- Reorganising assets
- Export of capital
- Locking us into international economic programmes.

#### Privatisation

The present policy of privatisation is the most obvious and cynical way of economically sabotaging a future democratic government. The regime is selling off the birthright of all South Africans. In practice giant state corporations will now be owned by those private companies that already control the vast majority of our economy - Anglo, Old Mutual, Rembrandt, Sanlam, etc.

Not only does privatisation greatly increase the power of a small minority, it hands over key social services and strategic industries from the state into private hands. More and more, a handful of rich bosses will be deciding who gets housing, water, electricity, transport, health care ... and at what price.

This is accompanied by much rhetoric about the greater efficiency of private companies. Such arguments are contradicted by the reports of commissions the regime itself set up to investigate the parastatals. These commissions found them to be extremely efficient. The view that private companies are always more efficient has been disproved in practice around the world.

The regime and big business further allege that competition in the private sector will increase the efficiency of privatised companies. What they do not mention is that Escom, Sats, etc are in effect monopolies. State monopolies will become private monopolies. Competition could not be further from the reality.

Privatisation is a serious act of bad faith. All those who buy into these companies must be regarded as accomplices in this act of bad faith. They will have to take the consequences when the future democratic government considers how to rectify the situation.

## Reorganising Assets - Shifting the Furniture

While the regime manoeuvres, we can be sure that big business is also hurriedly sabotaging the future. They will be shifting the furniture within their vast economic empires. New companies will be created, money, assets and the patterns of ownership will be hidden in dark corners. They are trying to organise in advance of any future redistribution of wealth.

#### Exporting Capital

Another way of ensuring that the cupboard is bare for a future government is the exporting of large amounts of capital. Big business is using its overseas operations to do this. This explains the transfer of no less a person than Anglo chairperson, Gavin Relly, to head their overseas Minorco operations. We have only to look at Namibia to see the success of a policy of bleeding a country dry just before independence. In Namibia the banks were empty when the elected SWAPO government took office.

## Locking us into International Arrangements

The regime has suddenly become desperate to be readmitted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Why? Perhaps they hope to involve South Africa so deeply in one of the IMF's economic packages, a future government will not be able to disentangle itself. The IMF is notorious worldwide as an agent of imperialism, using loans and threats to direct and control the economies of the developing world.

#### What Should be Done?

We need to set up monitoring committees that include experts. The committees should monitor all the sabotaging manoeuvres of the regime and big business. These must be publicised and we must develop ways of countering such manoeuvres.

Such monitoring must not be the monopoly of experts alone. Workers and professional staff in areas like banking, company law, and foreign trade must be mobilised into this work.

We must engage much more actively in the present economic debate. We can win the broad support of a very wide range of South Africans in combatting this economic sabotage of our common future.

### NO LET-UP ON SANCTIONS!

## THE CHALLENGES OF DUAL POWER

After February 2nd a wave of mass action has engulfed the country. In these actions, the people address their day-to-day grievances as well as the central issue of political power. Many township councillors and bantustan functionaries have succumbed to popular pressure.

On the other hand, the regime has adopted a new approach to the crisis it faces. Pretoria's preparedness to negotiate is a reflection of this new strategy. But De Klerk has openly stated that his regime would not permit the removal of apartheid's administrative structures. To this end, massacres and arrests have taken place.


There are clearly two powers within South Africa today. These powers exist side by side and are contesting for political control.

On the one side is the regime, with its administration, army, police and other machineries. On the other side is the as-yet fledgling power: the democratic movement led by the ANC. In what form then does dual power manifest itself?

In answering this question we must take into account the changed and changing political terrain. We must identify the link among various strands, some of them seemingly unrelated and even contradictory:

- Mass actions in a number of townships have resulted in the collapse of ghetto councils and the setting up of people's committees.
- In some bantustans, anti-apartheid forces or sympathetic elements are running the administrations.
- Under the pressure of mass struggles, a number of previously anti-people forces in the councils, bantustans and tri-cameral parliament have come 'repentant' to the democratic movement and put themselves at the movement's disposal.
- Within the police and army, especially in the bantustans, more and more individuals are identifying with the people's cause.
- In addition is the overwhelming mass support enjoyed by the ANC and the rest of the democratic movement.

The challenge we face is to develop these various elements in an integrated manner.



In this regard, the central task is that of building the people's forces in action. In all areas of the country, irrespective of the concrete political situation, we should build the ANC, the Party and other democratic formations. We must set up people's committees at street, area and other levels and impose people's 'law and order' through self defence units. We must strive to win enemy forces to our side. In regions such as Bophuthatswana, where tyrants are still in control, we must see to their removal.

Does this mean that if we have removed the ghetto councils, we should take over the administration of the townships? How do we then restructure these administrations? How do we relate to the white City Councils and the regime's administration in general?

Where unpopular regimes have been overthrown, should democrats take part in the bantustan administrations? What would be the strategic and practical implications of such a step? Should we rather rely on advice and critical support? How do we address the question of work in the armed forces of these bantustans?

These are some of the difficult questions we face. Further, going into broad fronts with elements who have recently reperted does pose problems of the crimes that some of them have committed, rank opportunism among them and popular revulsion against them. We have to conduct rigorous education among the people and the 'new allies', and see to it that programmes agreed upon are implemented.

The approach to dual power rests on the building of people's committees and the people's forces in general. But it also depends on our ability to put to good use the space that we win in struggle.

## NO MINORITY DOMINATION!

## **MILITANCY OR DISCIPLINE?**

There has been a tendency, especially in the present, for comrades to **oppose** militancy and discipline. We are in the midst of a rapidly changing situation. We need to assess and adapt tactics continuously. So it is perhaps understandable for comrades on the ground to sometimes misunderstand, or to only hear one side of the message coming from the leadership of our national liberation movement.

For instance, we sometimes hear rank-and-file comrades saying: 'What we now need is discipline, not militancy. Militancy only plays into the hands of De Klerk' Or we hear the opposite: 'We are so disciplined these days, we're falling into FW's trap'

But it is quite wrong to oppose discipline and militancy in this way. They are not opposites.

Ot course, in a changing situation, it is true that we do need to fine-tune our tactics correctly. We need to be very skilful in our approach, always seeking to achieve the correct balance between disciplined militancy and militant discipline.

In this regard there are important lessons to be learnt from some recent events. We are thinking of the looting on the fringe of the Cape Town Grand Parade reception for comrade Mandela, events in the Ciskei following the removal of Sebe, and Kathlehong.

Actions must always be located in a specific situation. By and large the apartheid regime's security forces remain relatively strong. Where we allow the regime to deploy its security forces, without it paying a high political price in doing this, we lose some ground. At the same time the SAP and the SADF regain some of their rapidly-declining morale and sense of purpose.

An overflowing of popular enthusiasm and celebration in the Ciskei following the fall of the hated Sebe regime was completely understandable. It is the duty of the ANC, the Party and the mass organisations to inspire such mass feeling and to direct it.

Instead of looting and arson, what possibilities were there for assuming disciplined popular control over the properties of Sebe and his henchmen? Where were the workers' industrial locals that could assume political control of their industrial areas? Where were the popular forces that could have mounted joint patrols with patriotic elements of the Ciskei Defence Force?

Well, there are perhaps many good explanations for these absences. But the point is that, in the present fluid situation, we must develop the capacity to build popular forces. Forces that are capable of taking control, of ensuring discipline. Forces that, where possible, make any SADF and SAP intervention very costly in political and moral terms.

But, above all, let us be very clear. A call for discipline is not a call for mass passivity and inertia.

## **VOTES FOR ALL!**

## LETTER TO UMSEBENZI

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF LEADERSHIP

Comrades, we are rapidly moving into a situation in which we may well have an ANC-dominated government within five years. But let us not assume imperialist circles and our own ruling class have no long-range plans. They are not just abandoning the struggle! I don't mean there is some detailed blue-print. But our enemies are learning and experimenting in Eastern Europe, in Nicaragua, in the southern African region.

Having failed to defeat the ANC, they will try to draw its teeth instead. Privatisation and deregulation belong to one strategy. They want to make sure a future democratic government inherits much less economic power than that enjoyed by white minority regimes over the decades. On the political front, imposing some kind of minority group veto is a similar strategy.

But what I particularly want to mention is a strategy I call 'losing the first one-person one-vote elections, so you can win the second'. What do I mean?

I am thinking of the strategy of scape-goating. That is, getting a new leadership to bear the burden and blame for the difficulties and disappointments caused by an objective situation. Or, perhaps even more likely, caused by deliberate destabilisation. And here recent events in Nicaragua have some relevance.

There is no doubt that political, social and economic transition to a new, non-racial and democratic South Africa will bring a phase of dislocation. The present ruling class and imperialist circles will do everything in their power to exaggerate these problems. They will use their media to try to separate the liberation movement's leadership from its mass support.



There are two golden rules for handling this counter-revolutionary strategy, and Lenin set the example in the difficult transition years after 1917 in the Soviet Union.

- Absolute honesty before the masses. If things are difficult or going badly, if wrong decisions have been made, all of these must be explained and openly admitted to the people. Every step with the people! Trust the people politically! No false promises, no attempts to buy favours!
- And, most especially, the future leadership of our country must not live above the masses. Surely this is a prime lesson from the present crisis in Eastern Europe? Special privileges, an elite style of life, arrogance, undemocratic behaviour these things are an open invitation to the counter-revolution.

If I am raising these questions now, it is because they are not such distant concerns. As we build a massive ANC and a large Party in the coming months, let us ensure that, right from the start, we demand a very clear code of conduct from our leaders.

## STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY!

### PARTY MEMBERSHIP - A READER'S VIEWS

Dear Comrades,

I am a 1976 generation ANC member presently deployed in Lusaka. Although I am not a Party member, I have long identified with the aims and ideals of the SACP.

However, in all my years in exile I have never been approached to be a member. I accept that the Party tries to set high standards for membership. I am sure I have my own shortcomings, like anybody else. But I do not think I am any more deficient than many fellow comrades known to me as SACP.

In recent issues of Umsebenzi (appealing, I presume, to comrades at home) you have called on all socialists to find their home in the SACP. What about long-serving ANC members who are socialists but not Party members?

Yours in struggle,

Z.M.

#### Umsebenzi Response

We greatly welcome comrade Z.M.'s timely letter. We are aware that, owing to the very small full-time structures operated by the Party outside (and also owing to our own subjective shortcomings, no doubt) there are many outstanding ANC comrades who have never been approached to join our Party. It has come to our notice that there has also been a widespread, but partial misconception that the only way of joining our Party was by invitation. There are, therefore, many outstanding revolutionaries in ANC ranks, who are committed to socialism and to the ideals of our Party, who must feel uncertain about why they have never received 'invitations'.

The Party will soon be much less invisible. There is no way that we will do justice to the organisational demands of the time without the assistance, not just of workers and militant youth at home, but of very many ANC members who, for one reason or another, are not yet Party members.

We urge all those who support the aims and objectives of the SACP to get in touch with our Party. At the present time this can be done in correspondence to:

- \* The General Secretary, SACP, c/o PO Box 31791, Lusaka, or
  - Inkululeko Offices in London.

But, more relevantly, in the near future the Party will be opening public offices in the major centres within our country.

We hope to see you there!

## **BUILD THE PARTY!**



The re-launch soon of the ANC Youth League is a major step in the organisation of this vital sector. The ANC Youth League was originally formed in 1944 under the leadership of comrades Lembede, Sisulu, Tambo and Mandela. In the late 1940s and early 50s it played a central role in developing the ANC into a mass-based militant organisation.

The Congress Youth League will be relaunched now in conditions where vast sections of the South African youth are involved in active service against the regime.

#### Undaunted Young Lions

No repressive measure of the regime has succeeded in daunting the youth. The mass killings of 1976, instead of quenching the fires of revolt, gave rise to a generation of militants now to be found everywhere - in our Party, the ANC and the Mass Democratic Movement.

During the 1980s the youth of South Africa. in unity with other sections of our people, shook the apartheid regime. It was the youth who patrolled the barricades established during the 84-86 uprising, harassed the enemy's security forces and protected communities against 'vigilantes'.

Active involvement has not been limited to the black youth - indeed white youth have been at the forefront of their community's resistance to apartheid. The stands taken against military service - despite the threat of six years' imprisonment - and the mass actions of students in both

English and Afrikaans-speaking campuses are testimony to this.

The central task now facing the Youth League is to weld all the energies of South Africa's young people into a single movement; into a movement which is capable of carving out a peaceful and prosperous future for all coming generations.

The building of the Youth League is both a related and distinct task from the broader task of building the ANC into a powerful mass-based organisation. The process of creating youth branches leading to the formal launch of the Congress Youth League must at the same time contribute to the building of the ANC.

#### Leadership and Organisation

But there are specific youth-related tasks upon which the League will be concentrating. The decision that the League should be organisationally autonomous will allow it to follow its own programme under the broad direction of the ANC.

The League will have to provide cohesion and leadership to the efforts of the youth. Correct youth leadership will ensure that tactics chosen in the course of struggle will be in keeping with the demands of the situation. This is important where conditions differ from region to region, or even from one township to another. Our tactics in areas like the Transkei or Ciskei, or where certain community councils are willing to carry out the wishes of our people, will be different from those used in situations where the regime continues to suppress our people brutally.

It will also be important to build strong Youth League branches throughout the country. The Youth League needs to organise in all parts of the country, not simply in key urban areas. It must attempt to organise all sections of the youth population, not only the most militant.

Another important task for the League will be the development of youth leaders. Political education and training programmes as well as the sharing of responsibilities among activists will assist in the process of fostering leadership.

#### Uniting for the Future

Above all, the Youth League must be committed to uniting the broadest range of young South Africans. The League will have to address sectors as diverse as working and professional youth, students, women, white youth, religious and rural youth, youth in apartheid's army and police, as well as those active in cultural, sporting and environmental organisations.

The successful welding of this variety of forces will certainly lay the basis for a new South Africa.

**BUILD THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATION!** 

## THE SACP AND

#### A PERSONAL VIEWPOINT

Words like 'an historic conference', or 'a milestone in our struggle', are like old 5 cent pieces. They're forgettable. They've lost their shine with too much handling. That's a pity, because 'historic' in its full and plain meaning describes exactly the three-day COSATU/SACP meeting at the end of March in Harare.

The meeting brought together a 28-person SACP delegation led by comrade Joe Slovo, and a 31-person COSATU delegation led by Vice President Chris Dlamini. For three days Party and COSATU delegates discussed intensively a range of topics - the history of the Party (its rich traditions and some failures); the present crisis in the socialist world; an economic policy framework for a new South Africa; the Workers' Charter campaign; the national question; and the role of trade unions and the Party.

It was an historic meeting for a number of reasons.

- It was the first of its kind, bringing together officially the two major formations active among the South African working class.
- For the first time since its banning nearly 40 years ago, the SACP was surfacing a relatively large delegation.
  - Even amongst the Party delegation there were some surprises as 'closet communists' emerged from the shadows!
- For the Party and COSATU, both committed to struggling for socialism in our country, the international situation contributed to the historical character of the meeting. At a time when anti-socialist propaganda is having a free rein worldwide, it is a matter of pride that in our country the red flag is flying high. The mass prestige of socialism in our country provides an opportunity and a challenge that both the SACP and COSATU delegations expressed a determination to seize.
- Above all, the meeting was historic because of, literally, the history that lies behind it. I am thinking of the immediate history of the last fifteen years or so, and the longer history going back to our Party's formation in 1921.

As we all know, the progressive trade union movement in our country began to regroup and build itself again in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 Durban strikes. Running alongside these organisational developments was a growing popularisation and working class support for the ideals of socialism.

From its formation in 1921 our Party and its militants played a pioneering role on the trade union front - Bill Andrews, Jimmy la Guma, John Gomas, JB Marks, Ray Alexander, Moses Kotane - the list of communist trade union militants is endless. For decades in the leadership of the progressive trade union movement, non-party members were the exception, not the rule.

The re-birth of a powerful trade union movement in the 1970s owed a lot to earlier traditions. There were also underground Party cadres who played their part - both organisationally and ideologially. But it would be a distortion to claim that our



## COSATU MEET



party alone played the leading role in the organisational development of the new generation of unions that merged into COSATU in 1985.

Hundreds of non-party worker-leaders and revolutionary intellectuals played an outstanding role in these developments. They were non-party, at least in many cases, not in the sense of being anti-party. They just couldn't find the Party. Our Party was largely invisible, and in two senses. It was underground, and in the late 1970s it had little independent profile from the ANC.

Of course there were also those in the emerging trade unions with serious doubts about our Party. There were misgivings about style or operation - would our Party attempt to capture the trade union movement by manoeuvre and infiltration? And what about our Party's strong commitment to the national democratic struggle as a stage towards socialism? There were those who thought it was just a way of postponing any serious consideration of socialism. (And we should admit that at least some formulations in Party publications gave the impression that there was a vast chasm between the national democratic struggle and the anti-capitalist struggle for socialism).

Organisational developments give rise to ideological currents. By the early 1980s there were powerful trade unions

and a whole range of militant community-based, sectoral organisations.

As we know, these were the seed-beds for two contrasting ideological currents that came to be labelled 'workerism' and 'populism'. Each had its strong points, each its own one-sidedness and limitations.

By 1983/4 there was a serious danger that the two streams of struggle (national and class) which our Party, virtually since its inception, had struggled to hold together, would fly apart.

That danger has been averted - in the first instance and above all, practically - on the ground in struggle. The growing unity in action between COSATU and the UDF in the second half of the 1980s was testament to this. Umsebenzi also made an important ideological contribution to overcoming the limitations and dangers in the workerism/populism debate.

But, if our Party has been able to contribute positively to these developments, it has not been from superior or complacent position. We have been able to inject over 70 years of struggle experience. But we have also had to learn - not least from the now-powerful trade union movement grouped under the umbrella of COSATU.

What did we have to learn? Or re-learn? Many things, but above all that a powerful, politically conscious working class needs - in fact demands - its own political party - an active, independent party committed to socialism.

This might seem strange, but it is true. COSATU has helped the SACP to

re-discover itself.

All of this is history. Recent history. It was precisely this recent history, shared by all the delegates to the SACP/COSATU meeting, that created a special atmosphere and which gave a particular ring to all the discussions in our, yes, 'historic' meeting.

## ALLIANCE OF THE ANC/SACP/COSATU!

## PENPICTURES OF SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNISTS

#### JACK SIMONS

JACK SIMONS Now in his 80s, Jack Simons still retains the intellectual youthfulness that has had such a major influence on our Party, and on our broad national liberation movement. Jack was born on February 1st, 1907 in the Cape. He studied in South Africa, and later in London where he obtained a doctorate from the London School of Economics. He returned to South Africa in 1937 and joined the Cape Town District Committee of the CPSA.

He went on to be professor of Comparative African Government and Law at the University of Cape Town. He married Ray Alexander in 1941, and for nearly 50 years they have formed a formidable revolutionary couple. In 1939 Jack was elected to the Political Bureau of the Party, and he served for a time as Party chairman, and on leading Party organs until the CPSA's banning in 1950.

The author of numerous books, articles, pamphlets and lectures, Jack's best known work is the classic, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, which he co-authored with his wife, Ray. In the early 1960s Jack was banned by the apartheid regime from the university, and prohibited from writing anything for publication. In 1964 Jack and Ray were forced into exile, and for some 26 years they were to be based in Lusaka. It was there that, for many years, Jack was professor of Sociology at the University of Zambia.

In February 1990, a few weeks after the unbanning of the Party and the ANC, Jack and Ray were among the very first ANC exiles to return openly to South Africa to a warm, enthusiastic welcome.

Jack has made many important contributions to our struggle. But his greatest skill is as a teacher. Throughout the ranks of our liberation movement there are young, and not so young, cadres who are proud to count Jack as their mentor. We reproduce here the memory of one such cadre:

"I was one of the '76 generation who found themselves in great numbers in the MK camps of Angola in the late 1970s. It was there that I first met comrade Jack, commissar Jack. I had imagined that communists were hard-line and dogmatic. Not comrade Jack.

"We would be gathered in company strength - about 80 to 100 of us - under a tree. Down below us would be a river, and in the background this lovely mountain. Jack would be standing by a black-board.



"'Right comrades, today we are studying the difference between subjective and objective factors. Can anybody please explain the difference?'

"Silence...Then one comrade comes with a long, complicated answer that he has clearly got from a book. Comrade Jack asks if this has made the matter clear.

"Again, silence. Cde Jack lets the silence sink in for a long moment. Then he growls: 'Over there is a mountain. As soldiers you have been ordered to move a large mortar to the far side. How do you go about it?'

"Now suddenly there are a whole lot of participants. One comrade says we should get some cows to help pull it. Another says bicycles strapped together. Others agree, or come with more ideas... The river! Somebody remembers there is first the river to cross. Again there are a whole number of suggestions. All the time cde Jack is happy to sit to one side and listen. Finally, towards the end of our session, he gets to his feet again.

"'Congratulations comrades. You have given an excellent illustration of the difference between the objective and the subjective. The river and the mountain are objective factors. The cows, the bicycles, the log raft, the tyre tubes - these are all different subjective approaches to the same objective problems.

"'Tomorrow's topic: materialism and

idealism..."

## LONG LIVE MAY DAY!

## SOME DREAMS COME TRUE

#### VERWOERD'S DIDN'T

Are bantustans a terrain to contest? And to what extent can such contestation by the progressive movement lead to dual power?

These questions and many more have forced themselves on to the agenda. Simplified analyses of bantustans have tended to describe them as 'dumping grounds' or as 'rural areas'.

Yet significant industrial development has taken place in some parts of the bantustans (for instance, Mdantsane in the Ciskei; Seshego-Mahwelereng in Lebowa; or the Nkowankowa-Tzaneen-Lenyenye complex in Gazankulu/Lebowa). In some cases there are significant concentrations of intelligentsia around academic institutions like Turfloop, Ngoye and Fort Hare.

At the same time, there are large areas of the bantustans which are very rural in character (such as the Bochum area in Lebowa, parts of the Transkei, Venda and KwaZulu).

The social and political complexity of the bantustans is made the more challenging by the existence within them of various democratic formations (opposition parties, trade unions, mass democratic organisations of various designations, patriotic chiefs, etc).

At least 11.7 million people live in the bantustans, constituting a significant percentage of the oppressed. In short, the bantustans are complex, significant and challenging realities. They

simply cannot be ignored politically.

Recent events in most of the bantustans have once again highlighted this point. The coups by patriotic soldiers in the Transkei in 1987, in Ciskei and (questionably) Venda in March 1990, and the attempted coup in Bophuthatswana, mass insurrectionary uprisings in Gazankulu and Bophuthatswana, all point to the collapse of Verwoerd's dream. In all these bantustans, the question arises again and again: should revolutionaries participate in these institutions? And if they do not, who will fill the political and administrative vacuum created by the collapse of puppet structures?


There seems to be no problem in stating that revolutionaries should 'work with' patriotic forces like Holomisa, Gqozo, Mabuza and Ramodike. But could we not pursue a much bolder approach? One which deliberately encourages progressive forces to actively participate within bantustan structures?

But in that case, what guarantees do we have that once inside the bantustan administrations, such forces will not find it 'too sweet' and forget their primary mandate? Namely to bar the way to sell-outs and to use these bantustans as bases for further advances towards democratic power.

There are no simple answers. But there are two major principles to be followed:

- We must ensure there is mass mobilisation and mass organisation in the bantustans. Manoeuvres at the top, in isolation from the masses (no matter how well-intentioned) always run the risk of demobilisation and opportunism.
- The political perspective of a united, non-racial, democratic South Africa must always be maintained. All localised, bantustan-based struggles must be linked to this perspective. Revolutionaries must seek to broaden the political consciousness of the widest range of forces in the bantustans.

As we move towards full liberation, more and more elements of dual power will emerge in our country. Our own popular power structures will not necessarily be identical to those that emerged, for instance, in Russia in the run-up to the October Revolution. In our country, bantustans under patriotic and democratic forces will undoubtedly be one important component of an emerging dual power situation.



## **UMSEBENZI DISCUSSION CIRCLES**

We call on all workers and youth, on all our supporters who want to help build the Party, who want to deepen socialist understanding and socialist organisation - form Umsebenzi Discussion Circles in factories, townships and other places.

Discussion circles are very valuable in their own right. They can also help to lay the basis for a strong SACP rooted among the masses. It will be an SACP that emerges, partly, from a thousand local initiatives. As the Party's above-board organisation grows and develops within our country we will find each other and official structures can be consolidated.



How large should such discussion circles be? Until our recent unbanning, the Party encouraged the formation of very small discussion circles of no more than four or five comrades. But there are now possibilities to organise larger more open groups - perhaps of 12 or even 20 comrades. You should obviously be guided by the concrete possibilities in your own specific situation.

Remember, no group is too small. But if a group is much larger than about 20, it might be better to form two or more circles. The key is to ensure that everyone is free to discuss - a discussion circle is not a mass meeting! And you should meet no less than once every two weeks.

What can you read and discuss? Again, you must decide for yourselves. You should be guided by current problems and debates. The following are some suggestions:

- The Path to Power the Party Programme. A useful study-guide booklet on the programme is also available. It will help and guide your discussions.
- The 12-part history of the Party, from Umsebenzi. (In addition, you can read A. Lerumo's Fifty Fighting Years, South African Communists Speak, and Brian Bunting's Moses Kotane..
- Dialego's Philosophy and Class Struggle.
- Joe Slovo, The South African Working Class and the National Democratic Revolution.
- Joe Slovo, Has Socialism Failed?

Umsebenzi will, in future, be publishing a regular column of correspondence and notes from Umsebenzi Discussion Circles. We invite all Circles to write to us. Let us learn from each other's experience. As SACP offices and above-board structures are established, you will be able to contact us through them. In the meantime, for any advice, help or information, write to:

INKULULEKO PUBLICATIONS, PO BOX 902, LONDON N19 3YY

## LONG LIVE MAY DAY!

#### 'HAS SOCIALISM FAILED?': READERS RESPOND

The Umsebenzi discussion pamphlet, Has Socialism Failed? by Comrade Joe Slovo, has provoked much interest and commentary. We publish extracts from a few letters:

'The paper does away with the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the process of doing so, have we also abolished the concept of the dictatorship of the class of capitalists? Are we not disarming the working class whilst the dictatorship of capitalism continues?'

'My name is Maurice Jackson. I am an African American. I grew up in rural Jim Crow Alabama in the late 50's and early 60's, and later went back to my place of birth, Newport News, Virginia, which is the home of the world's largest shipyard. Like most people of my race and class, I worked in the shipyard and on the docks as a longshoreman, to make money to get through college. Today I serve as Chair of the Washington DC and Virginia District of the Communist Party of the USA, and am a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA. In club meetings (maybe you call them units or cells) here in DC, at study groups among all types of socialist-inclined people, Comrade Slovo's pamphlet is considered a gem. Things felt but did not have the ability or the knowledge or the courage to say aloud, Slovo said. He hit the nail on the head'.

'While Comrade Slovo recognises that the socialist countries degenerated into police states, he never seems to tackle the main question: What gives rise to the need for such practices? Is it not to contain and suppress a fundamentally explosive caste (or even class) contradiction in these societies? This certainly is the line of analysis developed by a long tradition of both 'left' and 'right' Marxist opponents of Stalinism.

Set aside our opinion of Trotsky as a politician, he nonetheless provided one of the most original critiques of Stalinism. He argued that the backwardness of Russian the depredations of the war of intervention, famine, the failure of the European revolution, all so isolated the young Soviet republic that it was compelled to fall backon its meagre resources. The price paid: a bureaucratic caste emerged (partly drawn from the working class itself) whose skills and expertise were desperately needed to maintain the state. This caste, according to Trotsky, usurped power from the proletariat.

While Bukharin would have parted company with Trotsky as regards his conclusions, he too sought to employ historical materialism to explain Stalinism. In Bukharin's view revolutionary Soviet power was based on an alliance between the proletariat and peasantry. After the abandonment of the New Economic Policy, capital was accumulated at the expense of the peasantry. The alliance was ruptured. The Soviet state lost the support of the vast majority of the peasant population. And so it was tempted to act in a dictatorial manner.

If Comrade Slovo's pamphlet is to fulfil its promise, it must assist communists in coming to terms with the history of their own appositionist traditions, 'left' and 'right', that go back to Trotsky and Bukharin. The South African communists have perhaps been the most backward in this respect!'

#### FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS!



## HOW TO MASTER SECRET WORK

#### 20. FAILURE AND HOW TO DEAL WITH IT

Our series would not be complete if we did not deal with failure in the underground and how to react to setbacks.

#### 1. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY "FAILURE"?

When members of the underground are exposed, arrested or killed, when the underground structure is broken-up or destroyed by the enemy - failure has occurred. Failure can be PARTIAL, were only some members are affected or COMPLETE, where the entire network or machinery is smashed. OPEN failures are those that the enemy chooses to publicise. CONCEALED failures occur when the enemy succeeds in infiltrating the underground with its agents but keeps this secret. In this case they make no immediate arrests choosing instead to patiently obtain information over a long period.

#### 2. REASONS FOR FAILURE

There are numerous causes of arrests and setbacks.

- a) Violating the rules of secrecy: This is one of the main causes of failure. To carry out secret work successfully everyone must strictly follow the organisational and personal rules of behaviour that have been outlined in this series. Common violations of the rules are:
  - failure to limit the number of links between persons (knowledge of others must be limited)
  - not keeping to the principle of vertical lines of communication (eg. a cell leader must not have horizontal contact with other cell leaders but only with a contact from the higher organ)
  - failure to compartmentalise or isolate different organs from one another (eg. comrades responsible for producing propaganda must not take part in its distribution)
  - poor discipline (eg. loose talk; carelessness with documents; conspicuous or unnatural behaviour etc.)
  - poor recruitment practices (eg. failure to check a person's background; failure to test reliability; selecting one's friends without considering genuine qualities etc.)
  - failure to use codes and conceal real identities
  - weak cover stories or legends

- poor preparation of operations and meetings
- violating the rule of "knowing only as much as you need to know"
- not using the standard methods of personal and impersonal communications
- inadequate preparation of comrades for arrest and interrogation so that they reveal damaging information.
- b) Weak knowledge of the operational situation: This means not paying sufficient attention to the conditions in the area where you carry out your tasks. Comrades are often caught because they failed to study the methods used by the enemy, the time of police patrols, guard systems, use of informers, etc. Mistakes are made if you fail to take into account the behaviour of local people, cultural mannerisms and habits, forms of dress etc. Knowledge of political, economic, geographic and transport conditions are part of the operational picture.
- c) Weakly trained and poorly selected operatives: The underground can only be as strong as its members. Poorly trained leaders result in weak leadership, weak communication links and poor training of subordinates. This leads to wrong decisions and incorrect behaviour throughout the structure and a whole series of mistakes. Care and caution are the key to the selection of capable leaders and recruitment of operatives.
- d) Weak professional, political and personal qualities: Serious shortcomings in the qualities required for underground work can lead to failure. For example a comrade who is sound politically and has good operational skills but who drinks heavily or gambles can put a machinery at risk. Similarly a person with good professional and personal qualities but who is politically confused can be the cause of failure. And a person with good political understanding and fine personal qualities but who has weak operational capability is best used for legal work.
- e) Chance or accident: An unlucky incident can lead to arrest but is the least likely cause of failure

#### .3. PREVENTING FAILURE

Following the principles and rules of secrecy greatly reduces the possibility of failure - "Prevention is better than cure". But when failure occurs we must already be armed with the plans and procedures for dealing with the situation.

### FORWARD TO PEOPLES POWER!

## 21. DETECTING AND LOCALISING FAILURE

When the principles and rules of secrecy are poorly applied, failure and arrests follow. The main dangers come from infiltration by enemy agents or the arrest of comrades on operations. DETECTING failure means to be aware of the danger in good time. LOCALISING failure means to act in order to quickly contain the crisis and prevent the damage spreading. The following are the main points to consider:

#### 1. REVIEW THE MACHINERY:

It is only possible to detect and localise failure if the underground has been built on a solid basis according to the correct organisational principles. A study and review of the structure, lines of communications and the personnel is an essential part of secret work. But it becomes impossible to obtain a clear picture if the underground has been loosely and incorrectly put together and is composed of some unsuitable persons. In such a situation it becomes very difficult to correct mistakes and prevent infiltration. A network which is tightly organised, operates according to the rules of secrecy and is cleared of unsuitable operatives is easier to review and manage.

#### 2. CHECK SUSPECTS:

This is part of the work of reviewing the machinery. It must be carried out discreetly so as not to alert the enemy or undermine the confidence of operatives. a) Review the suspect's behaviour, movement and performance; b) check with co-workers, friends, family; c) carry out surveillance by the security organ after exhausting the other checks to determine whether there are links with the police.

#### 3. SOME TACTICS OF ENEMY AGENTS:

- they try to win your confidence by smooth talk and compliments;
- they try to arouse your interest by big talk and promises;
- try to get information and names from you which is no business of theirs;
- try to get you to rearrange lines of communication and contact points to help police surveillance;
- may show signs of nervousness, behave oddly, show excessive curiosity;
- may pressurise you to speed up their recruitment or someone they have recommended:
- ignore instructions, fail to observe rules of secrecy.

Note: good comrades can be guilty of lapses in behaviour from time to time, and agents can be clever. So do not jump to conclusions but study the suspect's behaviour with care and patience. Sooner or later they will make a mistake.

#### 4. LOCALISING FAILURE:

This involves two things: acting against infiltration when it is detected and acting against exposure of the machinery and preventing further arrests, capture of documents, material etc.

- a) Acting against infiltration: The severity of action will depend on the stage reached and the danger posed. The enemy agent may be:
  - cut-off without explanation;
  - politely cut-off with a good, believable pretext (eg. told the underground unit is being dissolved);
  - "frozen" told they are not being involved because they are being held in reserve;
  - arrested and taken out of the country as a prisoner;

#### b) Avoiding arrest:

- The moment it is known that a comrade has been arrested those whose identities he or she could reveal must immediately go into hiding. Most arrests take place because this rule is ignored. Even if it is believed that the arrested comrade is unlikely to break, this precaution must be observed.
- Everyone must have an ESCAPE PLAN.
   This includes an early warning system; assistance; safe hiding place; funds; transport; disguise; new documents of identity;
- Endangered comrades may "lie low" until the threat passes or work in another part of the country or leave the country;
- All links must be cut with a comrade who has come under enemy suspicion or surveillance. In this case the comrade may be "put on ice" until the danger has passed;
- All documents, incriminating material etc. must be destroyed or removed from storage places known to the arrested comrade including from his or her house and place of work;
- All comrades must be instructed on how to behave if arrested. They must refuse to give away their fellow comrades and strive to resist even under torture. The longer they resist the more time they give their comrades to disappear and get rid of evidence;
- Everything must be done to help the arrested comrade by providing legal representation, publicity, food and reading material if possible, solidarity with the family, organising protests, etc.

#### **END THE BANTUSTAN FRAUD!**

## NOTES FROM THE UNDERGROUND



#### A New Situation

After the February 2nd unbanning of the ANC and our Party, all the units in our regional underground network immediately discussed the new situation. And I am sure this was happening in underground structures up and down our country! At first there were two schools of thought.

Some comrades were jubilant. After 40 years the regime, which had hoped to bury us once and for all, was forced to admit that the communist movement is unshakeably rooted in the soil of our country. In their jubilance these comrades were arguing that we should now immediately surface our underground.

But a second school of thought had different ideas. 'Nothing has really changed', they said. 'The apartheid regime is still in power. The SADF has not yet suffered a decisive internal "Cuito Cuanavale". We must proceed in our usual way'.

Of course, these views were a case of what Marx calls the unity of opposites. With further discussion we soon realised that there was some truth in both positions and some confusion. Dialectics in practical operation!

It is very wrong to imagine that nothing has changed. As the front-page article of the last copy of Umsebenzi (First quarter 1990) clearly puts it, the number one organisational challenge we now face as communists is the rapid building of a large, above-board SACP.

It must be an SACP that draws in the working class leadership thrown up by trade union struggles; the thousands of radical youth who support our perspectives; and the many revolutionary intellectuals. They must all find their home in our Party.

But what happens to the existing Party underground? It seems clear to us that at least for the moment this underground must remain intact. Things are still fluid. We cannot throw away this important weapon in our organisational armoury.

But what exact strategic role should this underground now play? Speaking of the Party underground, we think it should mainly play the

role of a **reserve force**. It should be a kind of internal 'rear base', a structure into which comrades can retreat if the whole efforts of legal Party building comes under serious threat through repression.

But how possible is it to maintain an underground largely as a reserve force? When we discuss this with veteran Party members they refer back to their own experience. They say that attempts were largely a failure, from the Party side, in the late 1940s, and from the ANC side in the 1950s, to build just such a reserve underground in anticipation of banning. They say that a reserve that is just a reserve is very difficult to maintain

This experience is worth thinking about seriously. But we wonder if there are not some differences that also need reflecting upon.

- Unlike the 1940s and 50s, many of our present comrades only have underground experience. Their entire political lives have been spent in clandestine structures. The problem we face may be the exact opposite to that remembered by our veteran comrades. Many of our new underground generation will find surfacing subjectively difficult.
- But in any case, the last five years with the States of Emergency have given tens of thousands of comrades plenty of experience in operating at a number of levels - mass legal, semi-legal and totally underground. Many of the comrades in our units have experience of combining all of these levels, and of using one level to act as a reserve for another.

Well, I am sure there are many comrades who will have differing views from these notes, which are just the product of collective thinking within our own specific network. But at least two things are clear.

We need to be very creative in our tactical and strategic thinking, and we need to assess all our positions in an ongoing and open way.

### FIGHT FOR A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION!

## Studying the Party Programme

#### 3. Study Guide to Chapter Three

#### Colonialism of a Special Type

In this chapter, the programme provides a basic Marxist-Leninist analysis of South Africa. This class analysis of our society will be used as the basis for the next three chapters which advance our strategy and tactics. The chapter consists of four main sections:

A scientific definition of colonialism of a special type (CST) - p19

A. Within different capitalist countries, the bourgeoisie rules through different kinds of domination that range from BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY to **FASCISM** 

B. The bourgeoisie also exerts its class rule across frontiers. It has used various forms of COLONIAL and NEO-COLONIAL RULE

C. In South Africa bourgeois domination is maintained through a specific

variant of bourgeois rule: colonialism of a special type (CST). This is capitalist rule in which the main features of colonial (rule across frontiers) are maintained, but as a form of internal domination.


2. The historical origins of CST - p20-22


The national structures that were installed in 1910 established the political conditions for the development of a national capitalist economy and national institutions of bourgeois political domination. These new national structures were based on the effects of centuries of European colonial conquest and land dispossession.

The class and social structure of CST - p22-31


CST is based on, and perpetuates, a basic line-up of class and social forces in our country.

- the dominated by monopoly capital.
- ses and strata that make up the oppressed black majority. The leading class force within the oppressed majority are the six million strong






4. The present crisis of CST - p31-33





- Opponents of the concept 'colonialism of a special type' have argued that it departs from a Marxist class approach. They have argued that CST obscures the fact of capitalist exploitation in South Africa. Re-read carefully the programme's definition of CST on p19, then discuss the above views.
- 2. How has South Africa's historical path to capitalist development affected our present situation?
- 3. Explain why you agree (or disagree) that today's crisis of CST cannot be resolved within the confines of apartheid colonialism.





#### THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION IS NOT OVER

Public opinion polls plus the atmosphere surrounding the huge mass rallies addressed by President Daniel Ortega had created the expectation that the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) would win an overwhelming victory in the elections that were held in Nicaragua on February 25. But it didn't turn out like that. The National Opposition Union (UNO) headed by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro gained a clear majority in the election for both the presidency and the legislative assembly. The Sandinistas who had created and defended the Nicaraguan revolution for ten bitter years against everything the counter-revolutionaries, both internal and external, could throw against them were forced to go into opposition.

The United States, which opposed the Nicaraguan revolution from the beginning and armed, trained and financed the murderous contra bandits who had attempted to overthrow the Sandinista government by force, claimed the election result as an extension of the popular insurrections which had overturned the communist governments of eastern Europe. But there is no comparison between Nicaragua and Eastern Europe.

The Nicaraguan revolution which overthrew the hated Somozan dictatorship in 1979 was a genuine people's revolution, and the social changes which then took place owed nothing to the intervention of any foreign force. The new government included representatives of all the main political tendencies in the country. It nationalised the banks, mines, fisheries, forests and the property of the Somoza family. It confiscated and redistributed unused land, but left most of the economy of the country in private hands. It was not communist.

It came under attack from both the right wing and the left wing parties - from the right wing because it was alleged to be Marxist-Leninist, which it wasn't; from the left wing (including the odd-ball Nicaraguan Commmunist Party) because it was not Marxist-Leninist enough. It was in fact a government of national liberation.

Armed attacks on Nicaragua were launched by former members of the Somozista National Guard from Honduras in late 1979, and by 1980 elements of the right-wing parties joined the forces of counter-revolution. In 1982 a second front of counter-revolution was opened from Costa Rica. These forces were supported in every way by the United States, which in 1984 went so far as to organise the mining of Nicaraguan ports.

The United States counter-revolutionary intervention in Nicaragua has continued without cease, although disguised to some extent after a World Court order that it should desist. In addition to this military intervention, which resulted in the death of 60,000 Nicaraguans and the devastation of huge areas of countryside, the United States imposed an economic blockade on the country which helped to ruin the economy. The gains which the people of Nicaragua had won from their revolution in the spheres of health, education and social security were wiped out by the cost of the cruel and dirty war waged by imperialism.

The National Opposition Union headed by Violeta Chamorro is an uneasy alliance of 14 parties advocating a return to capitalism, privatisation and close collaboration with the United States, but the election result should not be interpreted as support for these policies. Rather it can be interpreted as a vote for peace. The electorate was faced with the dilemma that a vote for Ortega, although a vote for national independence and social progress, was also a vote for continued confrontation with the United States, war, blockade and sanctions. After ten years of unceasing struggle and sacrifice, the population wanted a respite.

Certainly, this is the spirit in which the FSLN has accepted its election reverse - not as a defeat but as a temporary setback. It remains the largest single party in the country, with 39 seats in the 92-member legislature, as opposed to 51 for the UNO and one each for the Movement of Revolutionary Unity and the Social Christian Party.

In a communique issued after the election result was announced, President Ortega said the FSLN would struggle to uphold revolutionary gains, and stressed that the freedom of trade union organisation, the right to strike and freedom of the press were guaranteed by the constitution. The UNO would need 60 seats to change the constitution.

"The change of government does not in any way mean and end to the Revolution", said the FSLN communique.

The change of government took place on April 25, but the peace for which the Nicaraguan people voted is still under threat from the contras, who refused to carry out their previous undertaking to disarm by that date, and may still make a bid to displace Chamorro and seize power by force.

One way or the other 'a luta continua'

## REDISTRIBUTE THE WEALTH!

## SLOVO IN SOWETO

On May 6, SACP general secretary Joe Slovo returned to the cradle of our struggle, Soweto, to address a report-back rally on the Groote Schuur talks.

This is the text of his speech.

Today I feel I am truly back home.

To be here is to be in the very cradle of our struggle. Soweto has always been in the front rank of that struggle. To have the honour of talking to you is to talk to the future.

We are hear because you have refused to bow down to race domination. With the ANC at your head you - the people - brought us together.

With your organised strength in the factories and the mines you, the workers, brought us together.

With the roar of young lions, you the youth brought us together.

With courage and strength which matched that of the men you the women brought us together.

When we left the country 30 years ago we left a people angry but weak. The road of oppression which bound the oppressed for over 300 years was longer than ever.

But you have shown that no rope is long enough to bind the people who refuse to submit. Sooner or later the rope must be cut. That is the meaning of what an African slave once said; "Time is longer than rope". And the time to free ourselves of this rope has come. There must be no mistake about it. It must be understood that the time is now.

We used to dream of freedom in our life time. That dream is over.

We have woken up from our sleep. We want freedom now. We are not prepared to wait for a lifetime.

#### Mansions and matchboxes

On our way to Cape Town we flew over our city Igoli. It is one of the richest cities in the world.

But, from the air, we saw apartheid. On the one side we saw thousands of match-boxes which are called houses. On the other side we



Joe Slovo salutes the crowds at the Soweto rally

saw mansions with enough swimming pools to fill a river.

We saw chains of factories and many mine dumps. We knew who laboured under the roofs of those factories and in the bowls of the earth. And we also knew that it is the sweat of the working people - those who live in the matchboxes - which makes possible those mansions and swimming pools.

When we left the country this was so. And this is so today.

For us who have suffered the curse of exile for close to 30 years this is a moment of the greatest 
\* Continued on Page 22

joy. It is a moment of joy because we are at last back in this beautiful country and among the people we love.

But it is also a moment of sadness. It is a moment of sadness because there lied buried in our soil some of the finest sons and daughters of our nation. They gave their lives in battle during the long years when victory seem so far away. Some of them lie buried in foreign lands murdered by the enemies death squads.

Comrades it is they and not us who should have had the first place of honour on this platform. It is they, above all, who helped make this moment possible. It is their blood which has fertilised the tree of defiance and resistance. No force on earth will be able to cut this tree down. Let us raise our voices to the heavens in praise of their courage and patriotism.

#### **Groote Schuur talks**

We have just come away from a table which everyone is calling a table of peace. And we are happy that at last a white government is ready to talk across the table and through a barrel of a gun. And let us give credit where credit is due. De Klerk has shown a courage which no white leader has shown before him.

We left the table with the feeling that he is a man of integrity who means what he says.

This has provided a ray of hope that it may be possible to imagine an end to the climate of violence which has plagued our land for over 350 years. It is a ray of hope for all South Africans - black and white. Those who know our history also know that the ANC is not a recent convert to the struggle for peace. And we are committed to every word of the Cape Town Agreement.

But before we get too excited we must not forget that it is not enough that De Klerk means what he says. The future does not depend only on one man and the small group around him.

Those who are creating the boere armies, those in the police who pull the trigger, are not in the cabinet. It is they who intimidate the people prevent normal political life and who treat black life (like black labour) as cheap.

If they are not stopped there is no hope for peace.

Then we have people like ex-president Botha. In case you have forgotten him he is the man who is famous through out the world for having promised to cross the Rubicon. He never even got into the boat. Friends I don't feel hurt that he doesn't like me. If anything it makes me feel that I may

have done my job properly.

Mr Botha should remember that Comrade Mandela never though of him as God's gift to South Africa. Yet he swallowed his pride and, in the interest of peace, had tea with him.

I am sure that Mr De Klerk also does not like some of us. But at least he is big enough to try and

put the country first.

I will return to what was achieved at the Cape Town table. But for the moment I want to go beyond the table. I want to do so because what happened in Cape Town must not go down in history as a wasted opportunity. It will only lead to peace if the peace we are talking about takes us in a straight line towards a non-racial, united democratic South Africa. And we should stop playing with words.

We know only one kind of democracy and that is majority rule. We know only one kind of non-racialism and that is that an end must be put to all

political and economic race privilege.

We know only one home land. It is not KwaZulu or Bophuthatswana. A home land covers every square metre from Cape point to the Limpopo and from the mouth of the Orange River to the Indian Ocean.

If the kind of peace which some people want is designed to prevent the kind of democracy that we have been talking about then we can be certain that in the end we will only reach the peace of the grave yard. In the long run the only hope for real peace is if we hear from the government that September 1989 was the very last all white election. And we must move with the utmost speed towards a parliament elected by a free non-racial vote based on majority rule.

#### White veto

It really does not help the process of peace when we keep on hearing over and over again that there would never be majority rule. We are still being offered a democracy of a special kind which no one in the world has heard of. It is a so called democracy which will give the white group the right to veto the will of the majority. This in fact amounts to a veto on democracy.

It's like saying, "Yes you can have everything you want except what we decide to keep".

Then we are told by some who claim to be on our side: "Don't rush it-change is a slow process". It is said that De Klerk has gone further than any other white leader to seek a political solution. This is true. We are told that he would like to go further. This may also be true. But we are asked



Joe Slovo with ANC leaders Nelson Mandela and Alfred Nzo

to remember that he has a white constituency which he can not ignore. We are told that this constituency has become so used to the pleasures of race privilege that it needs a long time to absorb the shock of equality.

#### Opening doors

But let us give clear notice that Tambo and Mandela also have a constituency. It has been suffering from the shock of race rule for 350 years. It can not wait much longer for a new life. Mr De Klerk on February the 2 told his parliament how the people of Eastern Europe surged forward in an unstoppable tide towards freedom. These are very nice sounding words. But that tide is not just six thousand miles away; it is on his own door step. And it is a tide which is completely unstoppable.

We came to talk with the government in a spirit of conciliation. If there is a real way forward without strife and blood shed we will grab it with both hands.

We have been told by the State President that the door is open and we do not have to break it down. Well let's give him credit for having had the courage to take off a few of the bolts. But we all know that the master lock has not yet been open. In the end for there to be a lasting peace the master lock must be opened. If this does not happen, we will have to break it down.

We continue to live in a country chained by apartheid.

The vote, the land, the other economic riches, remain a virtue or monopoly of the white group. It is true that blacks also have a monopoly. But the monopoly they have is a monopoly of ghettos, of deprived children, millions of unemployed, inferior education, rural starvation, urban slums, low wages, and the bullets of some trigger happy police.

#### Message to white compatriots

Let us address a few words to our white compatriots. We understand some of your fears about

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the future. Some of you are nervous that we shall do unto you as you have done unto us.

Your leaders encourage you to believe that we will replace white domination black domination. You have also been brought up on a diet of propaganda that makes you believe only whites know how to practice democracy. When Mandela spoke his famous words dedicating himself to a life struggle against both white and black domination, he spoke for a movement which not only preached this message of non-racialism but also practised it throughout its history.

We say to our white compatriots we have no secret agenda. We believe like they do that there are certain rights which no majority should be allowed to take away. The right to language, culture, religion, political freedom; rights like these are holy.

If this is the type of veto they are talking about, we welcome it.

But this is not what they are talking about. They want a constitution which will permanently block the process of ending historically accumulated privileges based on race.

Of course negotiation is a question of give and take. But there a limit on what the one side give and the other side takes. This is the gap that must be closed if the dialogue which has begun is to lead to a political solution.

#### Achievements of the talks

Let me now return to the table.

Mandela said that the outcome in Cape Town was a victory for South Africa - not white South Africa. Not black South Africa. But the whole of South Africa. What was in fact achieved?

In the first place there will be quick movement towards the release of political prisoners. The release of those who gave up their freedom so that South Africa could be free. Some are waiting to be hanged. That we can never allow to happen. Their life is our life.

Secondly exiles will be able to come back. They are our militant who left the country to keep the struggle alive when the organisations were smashed in the early sixties. And at the head of those who left the country stands one of the greatest giants in our history Oliver Tambo.

Another victory for the whole people is the commitment by the government to do away with laws that stand in the way of normal and free political activities. Also to lift the state of emergency.

I want to repeat that our turn to armed resis-

tance proved once again that when it becomes a crime for a dominated people to speak in protest they will speak with an AK47. And it is because we spoke with an AK47 that dialogue is now at least in the air. We will only be too happy if conditions are created in which the AK47 can become a museum piece. Both sides have committed themselves to try to move towards peaceful negotiation. And we will do whatever can reasonably be expected of us to contribute to a climate for a political solution.

We regard what happened in Cape Town as part of our continuing struggle. And our continuing struggle calls for organisation, discipline and, above all, unity let us not forget these three vital words; organisation, discipline and unity.

Struggle which does not strengthen organisation leaves us naked when the noise is over.

We know that there is endless intimidation by the authorities. But, comrades, intimidation where it has occurred among us, must stop. It gets us no where.

Struggle without discipline provides an excuse for repression.

Struggle without unity enables them to pick us off one by one.

We want to say a few words about those armchair revolutionaries with their mythical armies who have hardly acted against the enemy and has screamed "treason" at the very mention of the word dialogue.

We say to them that there is little in their practice which can teach us about actual struggle.

It is precisely because we have fought and not just talked as the other side is forced even to begin to contemplate a political solution.

As we enter this first stage of dialogue we know that we can not achieve an acceptable political solution just through smooth talk.

How far we get will depend on the power of the people on the ground.

Let the air vibrate with demands for majority rule, for a redistribution of wealth, for land, for a constituent assembly elected by every person with an equal vote

Let us surge forward in a tide of wave towards freedom.

And let us not rest until we have won a truly non-racial united democratic South Africa.

This is the time for all of us to stand up and be counted, in words and in deeds.

Long live the ANC! Long live the SACP! Long live COSATU! Long live the Alliance!

Long live Tambo! Long live Mandela! Victory is certain. AMANDLA!